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In moral and political philosophy, collective obligations are promising “gap-stoppers” when 
we find that we need to assert some obligation, but can not plausibly ascribe this obligation to 
individual  agents.  Most  notably,  Bill  Wringe  and  Jesse  Tomalty  discuss  whether  the 
obligations that correspond to socio-economic human rights are held by states or even by 
humankind at large.1
The present paper aims to provide a missing piece for these discussions, namely an account 
of the conditions under which obligations can apply to loose collections of agents that do not 
qualify as collective agents in their own right. I first explain the notion of joint obligations of 
loose collections of agents (henceforth “collections”) as opposed to collective obligations of 
collections of agents that are collective agents in their own right (section 1), and argue that 
the conditions under which agents can jointly have obligations are the conditions under which 
they are jointly able to do what is required (section 2). I then build on Virginia Held’s seminal 
work on the (backward-looking)  moral  responsibility of  “random collections” to  develop 
such conditions for joint ability (sections 3 to 7). My discussion shows that collections of 
individuals can more easily be subject to moral obligations than previously assumed. It also 
shows that putative joint obligations need to be carefully time-indexed, and that it is largely 
an empirical  question whether  a given collection can be subject to a moral obligation to 
perform a given joint action at a particular time (section 8).
1  Collective obligation and joint obligation
Ascribing obligations to collections of individuals faces the following “agency objection”: 
Many collections  to  whom we may want  to ascribe obligations,  especially humankind at 
1 Jesse Tomalty. “The Force of the Claimability Objection to the Human Right to 
Subsistence”. In: Canadian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming), 11f. Bill Wringe. 
“Global Obligations and the Agency Objection”. In: Ratio 23.2 (2010), pp. 217–231; Bill 
Wringe. “Needs, Rights, and Collective Obligations”. In: The Philosophy Of Need. Ed. by 
S. Reader. Royal Institue of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006, pp. 187–207, pp. 201–203.
large, arguably lack collective agency. Moral obligation, so the argument goes, presupposes 
that  the  bearer  of  the  obligation  is  an  agent  –  after  all,  stones  and  trees  do  not  have 
obligations. Consequently,  it  is a category mistake to ascribe obligations to collections of 
agents that do not form collective agents.2
Bill Wringe responds to this challenge by denying the agency requirement for obligations. 
On his view, claims like “humankind ought to provide the means of subsistence to all those in 
need” do not ascribe obligations to “humankind” as a supposed agent. Instead, such sentences 
make claims about how the world ought to be, e.g. such that humankind helps all those in 
need, while leaving it unspecified who ought to see to it that the required state of a airsﬀ  
obtains. To use an example with an individual agent, the claim “Alex ought to get a severe 
punishment” does not assert any obligation on Alex’ part.3 Instead, it makes a claim that the 
world ought to be such that Alex gets a severe punishment, and leaves unspecified who ought 
to see to it that the world is such.
However,  Wringe’s  response  merely  pushes  the  agency  objection  to  another  level: 
Admittedly, there may be true “unowned” oughts, like the claim that life ought not be so 
unfair, which only concern how the world ought to be, without saying anything about what 
agents  ought  to do.4 But  in  most  situations where we want  to  ascribe an obligation to  a 
collection, the kind of obligation we need must be owned. In the case of socio-economic 
human rights, the obligations corresponding to rights must be owned by someone, because 
otherwise the rights would not be claimable.5 So with regard to obligations to assist all those 
in need, the question arises who ought to see to it that humankind assists all those in need.
Now Wringe ascribes obligations of assistance to humankind because ascribing the desired 
obligations to potential collective agents like states is riddled with problems.6 For Wringe, it 
then makes no sense to say that states ought to see to it that humankind at large helps all those 
in  need.  Instead,  Wringe  ascribes  ownership  of  this  obligation  to  individuals,  with  one 
qualification: The resulting obligation of individuals are not individual obligations to see to it 
that humankind helps all those in need, as this would fall foul of ought implies can. Instead,  
so Wringe, the obligations are obligations to do something that contributes to making it the 
2  Cf. Wringe, “Global Obligations”, p. 220, Wringe, “Needs, Rights”, 193ﬀ.
3 John Broome. Rationality Through Reasoning. Wiley Blackwell, 2013, p. 12.
4 Cf. ibid., p. 19.
5 Likewise, to make sense of ascriptions of blame, it is not enough that things ought to have 
been di erent, but that someone ought to have seen to it that things are di erent than theyﬀ ﬀ  
turned out to be. 
6 Wringe, “Needs, Rights”, pp. 194–195, 199–201.
case that humankind helps all those in need.7
However,  such individual moral obligations will  not do: In a simple form “You ought to 
contribute”, they imply that you ought to contribute even if not enough others contribute as 
well,  but  it  is  implausible  that  one  ought  to  perform such  pointless  actions.  In  a  more 
sophisticated conditionalized form “You ought to contribute if enough others do so as well”, 
it turns out that everyone discharges their obligation if no one contributes. Neither of these 
individual  moral  obligations  is  a  plausible  candidate  for  obligations  that  are  meant  to 
correspond  to  socio-economic  human  rights.  For  this  reason,  we  are  back  to  ascribing 
ownership of the obligations to see to it that humanity at large helps all those in need to 
humanity at large, which again raises the agency objection.
A better response to the agency objection is to understand ascriptions of obligations to 
loose collections of agents as joint obligations that are jointly owned by these agents together. 
To clarify the logical structure of joint obligations, consider that owned obligations in general 
are relations between agents and propositions, of the form “ a ought that  p”.8 The fact that 
such a relation obtains can typically be rephrased as a property of the obliged agent, of the 
form “Fp(a)”.9 Now collective obligations are properties of a single collective agent, where 
“Fp(c)” means that collective agent  c ought that  p. By contrast, joint obligations are non-
distributive plural properties of a plurality of agents, where “Fp(aa)” means that agents  aa 
jointly ought that p.
For example, “to form a circle” and “to constitute a group” are such non-distributive plural 
properties  of  collections  of  agents.  These  properties  are  plural  properties  as  opposed  to 
properties that apply to singular objects, because for these properties to apply, it does not 
matter  whether  the agents  together  form a  single collective  agent.  They are further  non-
distributive as opposed to distributive plural properties because they are not properties which 
all of the involved agents have individually, as no one individually constitutes a group or 
forms a circle. To say that an obligation is had by several agents jointly then neither means 
that  each  one  of  them individually has  the  obligation,  nor  does  it  mean that  they are  a 
collective agent who, as a single entity, has the obligation. Instead, the agents jointly have the 
obligation, which has the sui generis structure of plural properties.
7  Wringe, “Global Obligations”, pp. 226–229.
8  Broome, Rationality Through Reasoning, p. 14.
9  Ibid., p. 15.
Once we understand ascriptions of obligations to loose collections of agents as joint rather 
than  collective  obligations,  worries  about  the  lack  agency  of  such  collections  become 
irrelevant, because joint obligations do not even purport to ascribe an obligation to a single 
integrated agent in the first place. This does not mean, however, that a given collection of 
agents can be required to do just  anything. After all,  in the individual case,  there are no 
special worries about me being an agent who can bear moral obligations, but I can not be 
required to jump to the moon. So with worries about the lack of agency of collections of 
agents put out of the way, we still need to ask under which conditions a given presumed joint  
obligation  can  apply  to  a  given  collection.  These  conditions,  I  contend,  are  simply  the 
conditions under which the agents together are jointly able to do what they supposedly jointly 
ought to do. The reason why I can not be required to jump to the moon is that I am not able to 
do so. Likewise, it may well be that all humans together can not be jointly obliged to help all  
those in need, if we are not jointly able to do so. To evaluate this concern in any given case of  
a supposed joint obligation, we need an account of joint ability. The remainder of this paper 
develops precisely such an account.
2  Virginia Held and the responsibility of “random collections”
A distinguishing feature of joint ability is that a collection of agents is often jointly able to do 
much less than what it is possible for the sum of individual agents together to do. To see this 
point, consider the following example:
The Concert  Audience: A concert  audience  is  awaiting  a  performance.  Just 
before the performance starts, the conductor tells the surprised audience that the 
performance is interactive, which requires that in each row of seats, precisely half 
of the audience simultaneously stands up at the opening chord.
Now suppose that each person in the audience is able to stand up at that time, and that the 
number of people in every row is even. It is then possible that precisely half the audience in 
each row stands up at the opening chord, but it is not something that they are jointly able to 
do. The reason for this inability is that there are many ways for the audience to be such that  
half  of them in each row stand up. It  is then not clear to the individual members of the 
audience which of these ways should be implemented, and what they individually hence need 
to do. So a core task for developing an account of joint ability is to determine the conditions 
under  which  a  collection  of  agents  is  jointly  able  to  coordinate  on  one  of  several 
implementations of a joint action.
In a seminal paper, Virginia Held tackles this task by examining the conditions under which 
backward-looking responsibility for past actions can apply to collections of agents,10 and in 
her recent paper on the claimability objection to socio-economic human rights, Jesse Tomalty 
translates Held’s view into preconditions for joint obligation.11 Since the precondition of joint 
obligation is joint ability, we can then formulate the following Heldian position:12
Heldian conditions for joint ability: Agents aa are jointly able to perform joint 
action Φ if and only if there is at least one possible collective pattern of actions of 
aa that constitutes  aa Φ-ing, and it is “obvious to the reasonable person” what 
part each of the agents needs to play for aa to Φ.
In terms of notation, I shall use aa to refer to collections of agents, e.g. the listeners of the 
concert,  and clauses  of the form “one of the  aa-s” to  mean refer  to the members  of the 
collection  aa individually, e.g. to one of the listeners. By joint actions I mean things that a 
plurality of agents do together, e.g. to form a circle, independent of whether or not they have 
any specific joint intentions. A collective pattern of actions of aa is a vector of agent-action 
pairs which assigns each of the aa-s an action. In a possible collective pattern of actions of 
aa,  each of the individual  aa-s is individually able to perform the action assigned to her 
independently of what others do, and it is possible that all of the aa-s play their part.13
The Heldian conditions for joint ability explain why in The Concert Audience, the listeners 
are not jointly able to satisfy the demands of the conductor. This is because it is not obvious  
to the reasonable person what each of the listeners needs to do at the opening chord. The 
individual listeners can only randomly decide whether to stand up or remain seated, but the 
10 Virginia Held. “Can a Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally Responsible?” In: 
Journal of Philosophy 67.14 (1970), pp. 471–481, especially page 476.
11 Tomalty, “The Force of the Claimability Objection”, p. 11.
12 Held’s discussion can be translated into the terms of joint ability and obligation, because 
the conditions under which we can hold a collection of agents morally responsible for 
failing to perform joint action Φ are precisely the conditions under which the agents 
could have been morally required to Φ. These conditions, in turn, are just the conditions 
under which the agents would have been jointly able to Φ. 
13 To show why the second condition is necessary, consider the collective pattern of actions 
of all students of a university riding the very same bike at the same time. While each of 
the individual students can be able to ride the bike at that time, it is not possible for all of 
them to do so.
chance that they will thereby manage to have precisely half of them in each row stand up is 
very small.14
The  Heldian  conditions,  however,  su er  from  two  crucial  defects  which  make  themﬀ  
extensionally inadequate for determining joint ability: First, the reference to “the reasonable 
person” makes the conditions pick out joint ability wrongly. Second, the conditions so far do 
not  take  into  account  how  the  availability  of  preparatory  actions,  e.g.  coordination 
mechanisms,  a ects  agents’ present  joint  ability  to  do  something  in  the  future.  In  theﬀ  
following, I improve upon the Heldian conditions in these two areas.
3  Joint ability and the “reasonable person”
In the Heldian conditions, what individual actions need to be performed for the collection to 
perform a joint action must be “obvious to the reasonable person”. I argue that the reference 
to  “reasonable persons” is  mistaken and should  be removed.  This  is  because  it  not  only 
introduces  problematically vague concept,  but  also makes  the  conditions  for  joint  ability 
extensionally inadequate. To see this point, consider the following example:
The Treasure Hunters: A group of students study in a library, when one of them 
comes  across  an  aged  document  and  shows  it  to  the  others.  The  document 
indicates the location of a huge treasure. In order to retrieve the treasure, among 
other things, the students have to first discover the additional hidden script in the 
document,  which contains crucial  clues.  They then have to  travel to di erentﬀ  
locations on the globe to gather additional fragments with crucial information, 
and operate an ancient water-powered combination lock. The students do not yet 
know each other, and the group of students contains both chemists who are able 
to  suspect  and  discover  the  hidden  script,  linguists  who  can  read  it,  and 
mechanical engineers who can understand the lock. When finding the document, 
the students only know that it is a guide to finding a treasure, but do not know 
any other facts about the quest that may lie ahead of them.
14 With an audience of 400 in ten rows, the chance is about 0.125 per row, and 
0.0000000096 for all rows together. This means that inability in the morally relevant 
sense is weaker than sheer impossibility. To give another example, the very point of 
passwords is that only persons who know the password can access certain files or 
services. And while it is not impossible that I happen to enter the correct password to 
access your email account, I am not able to access it without knowing the password.
First,  the  Heldian conditions  are  too  strict,  i.e.  they pick out  some collections  as  jointly 
unable to do something which they are in fact jointly able to do. In The Treasure Hunters, it 
may not be obvious to some nondescript, average reasonable person who ought to play what 
part in order for the students to discover the hidden script. The Heldian conditions then judge 
that the students are not jointly able to discover the script. However, given the chemists’  
expertise, they may well be jointly able to discover it, because it is obvious to the chemists 
what they, possibly with the help of the other students, need to do to discover the hidden 
script.
Second, the Heldian conditions are too permissive, and judge that some collections are jointly 
able to do something which they are not in fact jointly able to do. For example, suppose that  
later in the quest, the students fail to disarm a trap, and get hit by arrows that are poisoned 
with a hallucinogenic substance. For finally accessing the treasure, they need to lift the heavy 
lid o  a sarcophagus. To the reasonable person, it is obvious that everyone should simplyﬀ  
pick some spot on the lid, evenly spaced from the others, and then lift it when everyone else 
is in place. So the Heldian conditions judge that the students are jointly able to access the  
treasure. However, in their present state, they may not jointly able to access it. This is because 
due to their hallucinations, they may not be jointly able to assess the situation correctly, and 
may, for example, see hundreds of other students around the sarcophagus and think that they 
are not needed.15
The lesson from these two problems is that agents’ roles need to be obvious not to some 
reasonable third party, but to the agents in question, and in the situation in which they find 
themselves.  This  claim,  however,  still  needs  to  be  specified  further,  because  it  can  be 
understood in two ways: It can mean that everyone’s role must be obvious to everyone, or  
that every agent must be such that her role is obvious to her.
To adjudicate between these two possibilities, consider again the first step in the students’ 
quest,  and ask  whether  the  students  are  jointly  able  to  discover  the  hidden  script.  Now 
15 For a more real-world example, on the Heldian conditions, a group of agents with severe cognitive 
impairments can turn out jointly able to carry complex tasks that are beyond their grasp, because the part 
that any given agent needs to play is obvious to the reasonable person. But since reasonable persons are 
typically conceptualised as having average and not severely impaired cognitive abilities, this assignment of 
roles can be far from obvious for the agents in question. They are then in fact not jointly able to carry out 
the task, and the Heldian conditions then allow for mistaken and morally highly problematic ascriptions of 
joint obligations and backward-looking responsibility to groups of people with cognitive impairments.
suppose that for the students to discover the script, only the chemists are required. Call the 
chemists “relevant” and the remaining students “irrelevant” in this situation.16 If the students 
are to discover the script, it must be clear to the chemists what they need to do, but it need not 
be clear to the remaining students what the chemists need to do. Furthermore, it need not 
even be obvious to the chemists what each other needs to do, as long as they know what they 
individually must do. So the Heldian conditions must be modified to only consider the roles 
of relevant agents, and to only demand that every relevant person’s role be obvious to them 
individually.17
Taking into account these considerations, this gives us a first improvement of the Heldian 
conditions:
Heldian conditions for joint ability (2): Agents aa are jointly able to Φ if and only if 
there is at least one possible collective pattern of actions of the relevant aa-s that 
constitutes aa Φ-ing, and for every one of the relevant agents, it is obvious to her what 
she needs to do if aa is to Φ.
4  Joint ability and obviousness
Having removed the problematic reference to the “reasonable person”, the next task is to 
elucidate the notion of “obviousness”. The main obstacle for individuals to know which role 
they need to play is the existence of multiple implementations of a given joint action. For 
example, in The Concert Audience, there are numerous collective patterns of actions which 
would all satisfy the demands of the conductor. In half of these patterns, a given individual’s 
role is to stand up, and in the other half, to remain seated. Unless there is a way in which one  
of those collective patterns of actions gets picked out as the one to be implemented, there is 
no way for an individual to know which role she needs to play if the audience is to abide by 
the conductor’s request.
More generally, if there are multiple collective patterns of actions that all implement the same 
joint action, then the agents face an equilibrium selection problem: Assuming that the agents 
16 More precisely, irrelevant agents are agents who can not make a di erence to whether or not all considered ﬀ
agents together Φ, no matter what the other agents do. Note that I here exclude actively frustrating others’ 
actions as a possible option.
17 Likewise, in the example of the concert audience, it is not required that every person knows what role 
everyone else needs to play, but solely whether or not she herself needs to stand up or remain seated. 
want to see the joint action performed, they prefer situations where the action is performed to 
situations  where  it  is  not  performed.  All  situations  where  a  suitable  collective pattern of 
actions is implemented are then at least weak equilibria in which no agent has an incentive to 
change  her  actions.  The  problem  is  that  if  agents  have  to  decide  what  to  do  without 
knowledge of others’ actions, they do not know which of the di erent equilibria to aim for,ﬀ  
i.e. they do not know in which of the di erent suitable collective patterns of actions theyﬀ  
should play their part. What is required for joint ability in such a situation is that exactly one 
pattern somehow sticks out to all  of the relevant agents. Now with regard to this  salient 
pattern, every relevant agent does not need to have beliefs about what everyone else precisely 
needs to do. Instead, each relevant agent only needs to have a true belief about what her part 
is in that pattern, and to believe that if the collective is to perform the joint action in question, 
she must perform that part. That latter belief of a given relevant agent amounts to believing 
that if the other relevant agents want the collection to perform the action in question, they 
will try to do so via a pattern that includes the said relevant agent performing that particular 
action.18 The salient pattern must be unique, because for coordination to be successful, every 
agent must have the same pattern in mind when forming this belief.19
Adding this condition, we get yet further improved conditions for joint ability. However, as I 
argue  in  the  following,  these  conditions  go  wrong  if  applied  to  pick  out  joint  ability 
simpliciter. This is because they focus only on subspecies of joint ability, namely immediate 
joint ability to do something without first having to perform any prior preparatory actions.20 
Restricting the scope of the present conditions accordingly, we get the following
Conditions for immediate joint ability: Agents aa are immediately jointly able 
to  Φ if  and only if  there  is  exactly  one  salient  possible  collective  pattern  of 
actions  of the relevant  aa-s that  constitutes  aa Φ-ing,  and which is  such that 
every relevant agent believes of the action which is her part in that pattern that 
she needs to perform this action if aa is to Φ.21
18 I am indebted to Kai Spiekermann for pointing out the need for agents to have some sort of belief about 
other agents’ perception of the salient collective pattern of actions.
19 For the concept of saliency, and understanding it as a “meeting of the minds” of the involved agents, see 
Thomas Schelling. The Strategy of Conflict. revised edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1980, pp. 54–59, 95–97.
20 Note that immediate joint ability allows for the available action to still take significant time, so it does not 
entail that the action can be immediately completed.
21 Note that the conditions state that each relevant agent believes of her part that she needs to perform it, rather 
than that she believes that she needs to perform her part in the pattern. I use this de re reference to agents’ 
roles to make clear that the agents do not need to have beliefs about the salient collective pattern of actions 
as a whole, but only need to have beliefs about those actions which are their individual part of that pattern.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine all the conditions under which a collective 
pattern of actions can become salient. However, two conditions are particularly relevant for 
the following discussion: First, a collective pattern of actions is salient if it is the unique most 
preferred collective pattern of actions for all agents, e.g. if it  is the least costly for all of  
them.22 Trivially,  it  follows  that  any unique  implementation  of  a  joint  action  is  salient. 
Second,  a  collective  pattern  of  actions  becomes  salient  if  it  is  explicitly  selected  by  a 
collective  decision,  where  the  content  of  the  decision  is  common  knowledge  among  all 
relevant agents.
5  Joint ability and motivation
Before turning to joint ability that is mediated via preparatory actions, note that the saliency 
conditions for immediate joint ability do not include any conditions on agents’ beliefs about 
others’ actions and willingness to play their part in making it the case that they together act in 
a certain way. This raises the worry that the conditions are too permissive, as they do not 
su ciently  take  into  consideration  obstacles  to  agents’ motivation.ﬃ 23 To  see  this  point, 
consider the following possible scenario during the students’ quest:
The Treasurestan Meeting: The  students  have  figured  out  that  the  treasure  is 
hidden in the country of Treasurestan, and have dispersed around the globe to find 
various further clues needed to determine the exact location of the treasure. They 
have agreed to meet up in the capital of Treasurestan at a given date. However, as  
they each go to their respective airports of departure, the news report  that civil 
unrest has broken out in Treasurestan, and that travelling to the country has become 
very risky. The students each see the news, and believe that they all have seen it. 
They each still  want to go through with the plan and want the team to meet in 
Treasurestan, but they are not able to get through to each other to communicate 
their views.
Each of the students is now faced with doubt about whether or not the other students will 
follow  through  on  the  agreement  to  meet  in  Treasurestan.  This  uncertainty  arises  first, 
because they may not be confident that all of the other students are still happy with the group 
22 I remain unconvinced by approaches which hold that a unique worst equilibrium is also salient in a way that 
can aid coordination.
23 For getting me to think more about issues of motivation, I am again indebted to Kai Spiekermann. 
going to Treasurestan under the changed circumstances. Second, even if they each had such 
confidence, they may not be confident that everyone else is likewise confident in each other. 
But if others lack such confidence, then they may fail to show up, not because they are not 
happy with the group going to Treasurestan, but because they may not be happy taking the 
risk of travelling there if it is possible that the other students do not show up. Third, similar 
considerations apply to a lack of confidence in others’ confidence in one’s confidence that 
others are happy with the group going to Treasurestan, ad infinitum.
The doubt that is sown by the news report may then make it less likely that the students all  
end up going to Treasurestan, even if they are all happy with the group going there under the 
new circumstances. This is because some students may then opt out because they do not 
consider it worth the risk of travelling to Treasurestan if they are not guaranteed that the quest 
will continue there. Their doubts can only be removed if the students can somehow form 
common beliefs about of each others’ willingness to still go to Treasurestan with the group, 
which would typically be done by communicating with each other.24 Such communication 
then not only assures the students of each others’ willingness to go to Treasurestan with the 
group, but also assures them of each others’ confidence in each others’ confidence, and so 
forth.
Because the lack of such common belief in each others’ willingness to see a joint action 
performed may reduce the likelihood that agents end up performing the action, it is tempting 
to include such common belief as a condition of joint ability.  More precisely,  since it  is 
perfectly possible for a collection of agents to be jointly able to do something even if none of 
the  agents  is  willing  to  play her  part,  the  condition  would  be  that  the  agents  are  in  an 
epistemic situation such that were everyone willing to play their part in the salient collective 
pattern of actions, they would have common beliefs about that. However, I contend that it is 
misguided to add such an additional condition, because a reduced likelihood to carry out a 
joint action does not necessarily indicate a reduced ability to carry it out. If the students in  
The Treasurestan Meeting do not meet up, this is because some of them did not put enough 
value on the meeting for it to be worth the risk of going to Treasurestan and ending up there 
alone. This problem, though, can easily be amended if only the students valued meeting up 
enough. In this respect, The Treasurestan Meeting is crucially di erent from The Concertﬀ  
Audience, where the probability that precisely everyone in each row stands up is extremely 
24 The needed confidence could also be created by agreeing beforehand that they are all happy with continuing 
with the quest in case of a crisis in Treasurestan.
small, and will not rise no matter how much more the listeners value success.
The doubts sown by the news report then make it motivationally more demanding to meet up, 
in that a stronger motivation of each student is required if, as rationally deciding agents, they 
are  in  fact  going  to  meet  up.25 But  such  motivational  di culty  does  not  constitute  anyﬃ  
reduction of ability. To give an individual example, suppose someone gives you a large closed 
glass jar with some cash in it. You are able to unscrew the lid and reach in to get the money. 
Suppose further that as you are about to open the jar, the person tells you that it is also filled  
with a radioactive gas. Now you may think twice before opening the jar, and depending on 
how much you want the money, and how much you are concerned about your health, you 
may decide not to open it. However, you remain just as able as before to get the money.26
For these reasons, I conclude that the above saliency conditions for immediate joint ability do 
not need to be supplemented with further conditions about agents’ motivations and beliefs 
about each other’s motivations.
6  Immediate and mediated joint ability
The saliency conditions for immediate joint ability together with the above discussion of 
saliency imply  that  if  there  is  no  salient  implementation  of  a  possible  joint  action  of  a 
collection of agents, then the agents are not immediately jointly able to perform the action. 
Now the most common way to create saliency is to coordinate by making a joint decisions on 
which implementation to follow. Making such a joint decision is itself a joint action, and may 
be one which, according to the saliency conditions for immediate joint ability, the agents are 
immediately jointly able to perform. Such preparatory actions raise the question of what we 
should say about the agents’ ability not only to coordinate, but also to carry out the joint 
action that requires such prior coordination.
For example, suppose that the conductor in The Concert Audience gives the audience one 
minute time to determine who will stand up and who will remain seated, and tells them to 
25 Note that this motivational di culty does not arise for irrational agents who fail to appropriately take risk ﬃ
into consideration. This further suggests that the problem faced by the students is not one of inability.
26 Matters are di erent if the jar is, for example, filled with spiders, and you simply can not bring yourself to ﬀ
put your hand into the jar. In this case, the likelihood of you getting the money remains low no matter how 
motivated you are to get the money. In this situation, the problem is not one of motivational di culty, but ﬃ
of psychological inability to perform the action in question. This kind of inability is taken into account in 
the understanding of possible collective pattern of action being patterns in which each agent is individually 
able to perform her part.
start assigning the tasks of remaining seated and standing up to alternating people in each 
row, beginning on the left end. There is then exactly one salient collective pattern of actions 
of all listeners that constitutes them coordinating their actions at the opening chord, and they 
are immediately jointly able to carry out this coordination. The audience is then at the time of 
the  conductor’s  demands  immediately  jointly  able  to  coordinate,  and  once  they  have 
coordinated, they are immediately jointly able to have half of them in each row stand up at 
the opening chord.  The remaining question is  whether the audience is  at  the time of the 
conductor’s request already jointly able to fulfil the request.
Held answers this question in the negative,27 and Tomalty’s discussion of whether socio-
economic  human rights  correspond to  joint  obligations  to  help  the  world’s  poor  at  least 
suggests  that  she would  likewise answer in  the negative.28 Contrary to  these positions,  I 
contend that agents can already be jointly able to perform actions which first require them to 
coordinate.  The Concert  Audience shows why allowing for such mediated joint  ability is 
necessary: Given that the listeners want to experience the best performance possible, they 
(rationally) ought to have half of them in each row stand up at the opening chord. If they do 
not fulfil the conductor’s request, then we are in a position to afterwards say that they spoilt 
the performance, and ought to have stood up as requested. However, if the listeners were at 
the time of the request not in some sense able to fulfil the request, and were only able to 
coordinate, then we could not make sense of this ought-ascription. We could only assert that 
they ought  to  have  coordinated,  but  the  most  plausible  explanation  of  this  ought  is  that 
coordination was necessary for them to stand up as requested, which they ought to have done.
What we should thus say about The Concert Audience is first, that the audience is at the 
time of the request immediately jointly able to coordinate at the time of the request. Second, 
after  coordinating,  they are jointly able  to  stand up as  requested  after  coordinating.  And 
thirdly, they are at the time of the request also mediatedly jointly able to stand up as requested 
after coordinating.
The key to properly understanding joint ability in situations that require prior coordination, 
27  Held,  “Can a Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally Responsible?”, p. 476.
28 Tomalty,  “The Force of the Claimability Objection”, 11f. Tomalty argues that short of a coordination 
mechanism, humankind can not be jointly obliged to help all those in need. Likewise, since setting up a 
suitable coordination mechanism is a highly complex task, humankind can also not be jointly obliged to set 
up a coordination mechanism. Tomalty’s brief discussion suggests that she does not think that present joint 
ability to coordinate on how to perform an action translates into present joint ability to perform the action 
later. She also does not seem to consider longer sequences of preparatory actions, which include 
coordinating on how to coordinate.
then, is to see that ability, as well as obligation, is (often implicitly) doubly time-indexed, 
namely to the time when the ability obtains, and to the time of the action one is able to do, 
and that the two times can come apart. Further, we need to acknowledge that joint ability 
comes  in  two  species,  namely  immediate  and  mediated  joint  ability.  The  task  for  the 
remainder of the paper is to determine under which conditions several agents are mediatedly 
jointly able to do something.
7  Conditions for mediated joint ability
Before turning to the conditions for mediated joint ability, note that coordinating is only one 
kind of preparatory action that creates the needed saliency at  the next step.  Coordinating 
makes collective patterns of actions salient by creating new information, namely facts about 
what collective pattern of actions has been decided upon or otherwise designated. Another 
way to create  saliency is  to  acquire  new information,  which  typically makes  entire  joint 
actions, as opposed to their specific implementations, salient. For the purposes of the present 
discussion, it is then possible to subsume sequences of joint actions as one action, as long as 
relevant information that the agents have does not change during that sequence. Steps in a 
sequence of actions are then distinguished from each other by the information that agents 
have.
Returning to The Treasure Hunters, the students are at the time of finding the document not 
immediately jointly able to retrieve the treasure, because there is no salient collective pattern 
of actions of the team which constitutes retrieving the treasure, and which is such that each 
member of the team believes of her part that it is needed for the team to retrieve the treasure. 
For illustration, suppose that the quest consists of only three steps:
-  deciphering the document (α), 
- travelling to di erent locations to retrieve further fragments with crucial informationﬀ  
and meeting in Treasurestan (β), and 
-  travelling  to  the  right  location  in  Treasurestan  and  operating  a  water-powered 
combination lock with the right code (γ). 
Before the document is deciphered, the students do not know where to search for the treasure 
and  where  to  look  for  the  additional  fragments.  Further,  before  they  do  not  gather  the 
additional fragments, they do not know where to travel in Treasurestan, nor do they know 
about the lock and its combination. However, as the students progress on their quest, their 
information and immediate joint abilities change. Because of this change, their immediate 
joint ability to retrieve the treasure at the final step translates into mediated joint ability at 
earlier steps, in the following way:
First, once they meet in Treasurestan with the retrieved further information, they are then 
immediately jointly able to travel to the right location and operate the combination lock. This 
is because at  this final step,  there is exactly one salient collective pattern of actions that 
constitutes everyone travelling to the right location and then operating the lock in the way 
instructed in the retrieved fragments.29 This pattern is further such that each of the students 
believes of her part in the pattern that she needs to perform it if the team is to retrieve the 
treasure.
Second, consider the moment after they decipher the document, and before they retrieve the 
additional information and meet in Treasurestan. At this point, they are immediately jointly 
able to retrieve the additional information and meet in Treasurestan. At the same time, they 
are not immediately jointly able to retrieve the treasure, because they do not yet know about 
the right location and the combination lock. However, this does not mean that their quest is 
futile and that they can not retrieve the treasure simpliciter : After all, at this point, they are 
immediately jointly able to perform an action which will bring them into a situation in which 
they are then immediately jointly able to retrieve the treasure. Further, they know that they 
need to perform the first action if they are to obtain this future immediate ability. For these 
reasons, they are at this time jointly able to retrieve the treasure later on.
Further, consider the moment before they decipher the document. They are then immediately 
jointly able to perform a joint action which brings them into a situation in which they are 
mediatedly jointly able to retrieve the treasure later on.  For this  reason,  they are already 
mediatedly jointly able to retrieve the treasure as they sit in the library and find the document.
Before  generalising  the  behaviour  of  joint  ability  through  time,  note  that  in  the  above 
discussion, I have assumed that at every step, there is precisely one joint action (even though 
with multiple implementations) that facilitates joint ability at the next step. Now suppose that 
there  are  several  totally  distinct  joint  actions  at  one  stage,  i.e.  not  just  di erentﬀ  
implementations of the same action, e.g. di erent ways to get to the location of the treasure,ﬀ  
29 More precisely, the students need to carry out further preparatory actions, e.g. to agree on a way to travel to 
the right location, and to assign tasks in operating the lock. I simplify the example for ease of exposition.
but  di erent  actions  altogether,  e.g.  first  going to  one  location  or  first  going to  anotherﬀ  
location. In such cases, precisely one of the available joint actions must be salient to the  
agents that are relevant for that action. That is, all of those agents need to believe that if all 
agents together are to perform the final action,  then they will jointly perform that salient 
preparatory action. So it must be salient both what, roughly, all agents together jointly should 
do, and how precisely they are going to do it. Typically, saliency of what roughly to do is 
easily given: First, there might be only one possible preparatory action, which is then trivially 
salient. Second, if there are apparently multiple options, then there is in fact a single and 
salient prior preparatory action, namely to together decide on which of those actions to take. 
Third, once such a decision is made, it makes precisley one of the multiple options salient.
Taking into account  the double need for saliency,  we can see that  joint  ability generally 
propagates backwards in time in the following way: If in a situation s2 at a time t2, agents aa 
would be (immediately or mediatedly) jointly able to perform joint action Φ2 at time t'2 ≥ t2, 
and are at an earlier time  t1 immediately jointly able to perform an action  Φ1 at  t1 which 
would  make it  the case that  aa find themselves  in  s2 at  t2,  and  the  relevant  aa-s  whose 
contributions can make a di erence to whether or not ﬀ aa perform Φ1 believe that performing 
Φ1 has this e ect, and that if  ﬀ aa is to perform Φ2, it will previously perform Φ1, then (and 
only then)  are  aa at  t1 mediatedly jointly  able  to  perform  Φ2 at  t'2.  Allowing for  longer 
sequences of preparatory actions, the conditions for mediated joint ability read as follows:
Conditions for mediated joint ability: Agents aa are at t1 mediatedly jointly able to 
Φn at tn if and only if
1. they are at t1 immediately jointly able to perform action Φ1 at t1, where 
2. performing Φ1 at  t1 makes it the case that  aa are at  t2 > t1 immediately or 
mediatedly jointly able to Φn at tn, and 
3. the relevant members of aa believe at t1 that aa performing Φ1 at t1 has this 
e ect, and that if ﬀ aa is to perform Φn at tn, they will perform Φ1 at t1. 
Note that these conditions are partly recursive, due to the reference to mediated joint ability 
in condition 3). Since joint ability simpliciter is the disjunction of immediate and intermediate 
joint ability, we get the following conditions for joint ability, where the recursion is more 
clear-cut and is indicated in boldface:
Recursive conditions for joint ability: Agents aa are at t1 jointly able to Φn at tn 
if and only if
A)  there  is  exactly  one  salient  collective  pattern  of  actions  of  the  relevant 
members  of  aa that  constitutes  aa Φn-ing at  tn,  and which is  such that  every 
relevant member of aa believes of the action which is her part in that pattern that 
she needs to perform this action if aa is to Φn at tn,
or
B) there is a joint action Φ1 such that 
1. there  is  exactly  one  salient  collective  pattern  of  actions  of  the  relevant 
members of aa that constitutes aa Φ1-ing at t1, and which is such that every 
relevant agent believes of the action which is her part in that pattern that she 
needs to perform this action if aa is to Φ1 at t1, and 
2. aa performing Φ1 at t1 makes it the case that aa are at t2 > t1 jointly able to 
Φn at tn, and 
3. the relevant members of aa believe at t1 that aa performing Φ1 at t1 has this 
e ect, and that if ﬀ aa is to perform Φn at tn, they will perform Φ1 at t1. 
Applied to The Treasure Hunters with three steps, the conditions for joint ability then work as 
follows: At the time tα when they find the document, the students are not immediately jointly 
able to retrieve the treasure at  tγ, so A) does not hold. Thus we need to check whether B) 
holds, i.e. whether 1) the students are immediately jointly able to perform an action which 2) 
makes them jointly able at tβ to retrieve the treasure at tγ, and 3) which the relevant students 
believe to have that e ect, and which is the salient way for them to achieve that e ect. Theﬀ ﬀ  
candidate for this action is deciphering the document. Now by the above considerations, the 
students are immediately jointly able to decipher the document, so 1) is given. As for the 
students’ beliefs, if they believe that only deciphering the document has the said e ect, e.g.ﬀ  
because they recognise that the document indicates the location of a treasure, then 3) applies, 
otherwise B) does not hold and the students are at tα not jointly able to retrieve the treasure at 
tγ. To check whether 2) applies and deciphering really does have this e ect on the students’ﬀ  
ability, we need to ask whether, after deciphering the document, the students are at tβ jointly 
able to retrieve the treasure at tγ. We then need to recursively apply the same tests again at tβ.
Since the students are at tβ still not immediately jointly able to retrieve the treasure, A) again 
does not hold. B) holds if 1) the students are at  tβ immediately jointly able to perform an 
action which 2) makes them jointly able at  tγ to retrieve the treasure at  tγ, and 3) which the 
relevant students believe to have this e ect, and which is salient for them. The candidate forﬀ  
this action is retrieving the additional information and meeting in Treasurestan. Now they are 
immediately jointly able to perform that action, so 1) applies. Assuming that the students 
understand the retrieved information correctly, we can assume that they will form the right 
beliefs about the necessary next step in their quest, and 3) applies – otherwise, B) does not 
apply and the students are not jointly able both at  tα and  tβ to retrieve the treasure at  tγ. To 
check whether 2) applies and retrieving the information and meeting in Treasurestan has the 
said e ect, we again need to check whether, after performing these actions, the students are atﬀ  
tγ jointly able to retrieve the treasure at tγ.
At tγ, A) applies and the recursion can stop, as we do not need to check for conditions B). So 
under the given belief assumptions, the students turn out to be at tγ jointly able to retrieve the 
treasure at tγ, and hence likewise also at tβ and tα.
Lastly, note that I again do not add any conditions about agents’ beliefs about each other’s 
motivations, for the same reason as that given in section 5: Suppose that for some reason the 
students come to doubt each other’s willingness to carry out a given step in the quest, or each 
other’s confidence in each other’s willingness, and so forth. They may then be unwilling to 
invest by performing preparatory actions that create further joint ability which they suspect 
will  not in fact be used to retrieve the treasure.  However,  the di culty created by theseﬃ  
doubts is again of a purely motivational nature, and can be overcome if the students place 
enough importance on retrieving the treasure. The students may end up not retrieving the 
treasure because someone pulls out when the insecurity about the quest’s success arises, but 
they nonetheless are able to retrieve it.
8  Conclusion and implications
I have argued that collections of agents can be jointly able to perform not only joint actions 
which, via salient collective pattern of actions, are immediately available to them, but also 
joint  actions  which  require  preparatory  coordinating  actions.  I  have  further  proposed 
recursive conditions for when a collection of agents is jointly able to do something.
In section 2, I have illustrated that collections of agents can be much less capable than the 
sum of their individual abilities. This claim now needs to be modified in light of the recursive 
conditions for joint ability: In the short run, when no coordination is possible, collections of 
agents  can  be less  able  than the  sum of  their  individual  abilities.  But  when agents  have 
su cient time to coordinate,  then they can coordinate on and are able to implement anyﬃ  
collective  pattern  of  actions  which  is  possible  for  them together  to  do.  The  question  of 
whether a collection is  able to do something is  then not  su ciently specific,  because inﬃ  
situations  where  the  bottleneck  is  agents’ coordination  and  acquisition  and  creation  of 
information,  the  answer  depends  on  the  time  frame set  to  perform the  joint  action.  The 
question is then not whether the collection is able to perform the action, but by when it is able 
to perform it.
For practical application to supposed joint obligations of humankind to help all those in need, 
this means that given enough time, all coordination issues can be solved, and humankind 
together is able to do anything that is possible for us together to do. However, it remains an 
open question how long such coordination takes, and answering this question is largely an 
empirical matter.30 Furthermore, from the need to coordinate, it follows that there are some 
things that we together are not able to do, namely to perform certain joint actions that require 
coordination and to do so without first coordinating. One important implication of this result 
is that there are some su ering people in the world that can no longer be saved, becauseﬀ  
coordinating on helping them will take longer than they can still wait. In the case of children 
for whom helping is already too late at the time of their birth, this raises the question if they 
were ever owed assistance. Philosophers who defend socio-economic human rights on the 
basis  of  joint  obligations  of  humanity  at  large  are  then  forced  to  consider  whether  yet 
nonexistent future people can be owed obligations, and can hence have rights to assistance.
Lastly,  considering  how  long  it  can  take  to  coordinate  ourselves  on  a  global  scale,  the 
impression can easily arise that we are now able to perform many crucial joint actions, such 
as e ectively mitigating anthropocentric climate change, only in the distant future. However,ﬀ  
this impression is mistaken. How long it takes for a given collection of agents to coordinate 
to perform some joint action depends largely on the number of preparatory actions that must 
be taken, and the time it takes to carry out each of these actions. The reason why international 
negotiations  e.g.  in  environmental  matters  often  takes  so  long,  however,  is  that  such 
negotiations are not merely about coordinating on achieving a single set aim, but include 
negotiations that involve the individual aims and preferences of the negotiating parties. But 
the resulting delays are not due to a joint inability to coordinate quicker, but instead a matter 
of not placing enough priority on getting coordination o  the ground as soon as possible. Soﬀ  
30 Cf. Schelling,  The Strategy of Conflict, pp. 162–165.
despite the formidable challenges of coordinating the world’s population, we together are 
able to do a whole lot more than we currently do, and much sooner than we tend to think.
